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Abstract
Massive MIMO and small cell are both recognized as the key technologies for the future 5G wireless systems.
In this paper, we investigate the problem of user association in a heterogeneous network (HetNet) with massive
MIMO and small cells, where the macro base station (BS) is equipped with a massive MIMO and the picocell BS’s
are equipped with regular MIMOs. We first develop centralized user association algorithms with proven optimality,
considering various objectives such as rate maximization, proportional fairness, and joint user association and resource
allocation. We then model the massive MIMO HetNet as a repeated game, which leads to distributed user association
algorithms with proven convergence to the Nash Equilibrium (NE). We demonstrate the efficacy of these optimal
schemes by comparison with several greedy algorithms through simulations.
Index Terms
Massive MIMO; small cells; heterogeneous networks (HetNet); user association; unimodularity; game theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) has evolved from a pure theory to a practical
technology, and has greatly enhanced the wireless system capacity by offering many degrees of freedom (DoF)
for wireless transmissions. However, due to the so-called “smartphone” revolution, mobile users are demanding
increasingly higher data rates for rich multimedia applications. Existing and future wireless networks are facing the
grand challenge of a 1000-time increase in mobile data in the near future [1]. There have been tremendous efforts
made aiming to cater for this demand. For example, based on MIMO and OFDM, LTE-Advanced targets at a peak
rate of 1 Gbps, but the average rate is still less than 100 Mbps. In the foreseeable future, such rates can hardly be
satisfactory for data-hungry wireless users.
To boost wireless capacity, two technologies have gained most attention from both industry and academia. The
first one is massive MIMO (a.k.a., large-scale MIMO, full-dimension MIMO, or hyper MIMO) [2], [3]. The idea
is to equip a base station (BS) with hundreds, thousands, or even tens of thousands of antennas, hereby providing
an unprecedented level of DoF for mobile users. The massive MIMO concept has been successfully demonstrated
in recent works [4], [5]. The second technology is small cell. A great benefit of deploying small cells is that
the distance of the user-BS link can be effectively reduced, leading to reduced transmit power, higher data rate,
enhanced coverage, and better spatial reuse of spectrum. Both massive MIMO and small cells are recognized as
key technologies of the future 5G wireless systems [6].
In this paper, we consider a heterogeneous network (HetNet) with massive MIMO and small cells, where the
macrocell BS (MBS) is equipped with a massive MIMO and the picocell BS’s (PBS) are equipped with regular
MIMOs. To fully harvest the benefits promised by these two technologies in an integrated HetNet system, it is critical
to investigate the user association problem, i.e., how to assign active users to the BS’s such that the system-wide
capacity can be maximized and users’ experience can be enhanced.
There are already several recent works pushing forward in this direction. In [7]–[10], the authors consider the
problem of user association in massive MIMO systems operated in the frequency-division duplexing (FDD) mode.
Y. Xu and S. Mao are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Auburn University, Auburn, AL 36849-5201. Email:
YZX0010@tigermail.auburn.edu, smao@ieee.org.
Shiwen Mao is the corresponding author: smao@ieee.org, Tel: (334)844-1845, Fax: (334)844-1809.
These papers are focused on a macrocell without small cells. In [11], user association in time-division duplexing
(TDD) massive MIMO system is addressed, where factional user association is allowed. Bayat et al. in [12] model
the problem of user association in a femtocell HetNet as a dynamic matching game and derive the optimal user
association. However, massive MIMO is not considered in the system model. In [13], the authors investigate the
problem of user association with conventional MIMO BS’s and propose a simple bias based selection criterion to
approximate more complex selection rules. Bjo¨rnson, et al. in [14] consider the problem of improving the energy
efficiency without sacrificing the quality of service (QoS) of users in a massive MIMO and small cell HetNet.
Motivated by these interesting works, we consider the user association problem in a TDD massive MIMO HetNet
in this paper, taking into consideration of the practical constraints, such as the limited load capacity at each BS, while
without allowing fractional user association. The main goal is to maximize the system capacity while enhancing
user experience.
More specifically, this paper contains two parts: (i) centralized user association and (ii) distributed user as-
sociation. For centralized user association, we investigate the problems of rate maximization, rate maximization
with proportional fairness, and joint resource allocation and user association. We prove the unimodularity of our
formulated problem and develop optimal user association algorithms to the problems of rate maximization and rate
maximization with proportional fairness. We then propose a series of primal decomposition and dual decomposition
algorithms to solve the problem of joint resource allocation and user association and prove the optimality of the
proposed scheme. For distributed user association, we model the behavior and interaction between the service
provider, who owns the BS’s, and users as repeated games. We consider two types of operations: (i) the service
provider sets the price and the users decide which BS to connect to, and (ii) the users bid for the opportunity of
connection. We prove that in both cases the the proposed algorithms converge to the respective Nash Equilibrium
(NE).
In the reminder of this paper, Section II introduces the system model and preliminaries. Optimal centralized
and distributed user association schemes are presented in Sections III and IV, respectively. Section V presents the
simulation study and Section VI concludes this paper. Throughout this paper, we use a boldface upper (lower) case
symbol to denote a matrix (vector), and a normal symbol to denote a scalar. (·)H denotes the Hermitian of a matrix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
The system considered in this paper includes K users and J BS’s, including an MBS with a massive MIMO
and (J − 1) PBS’s, each equipped with a conventional MIMO. The channel model is hj,k,n = gj,k,nlj,k, where
hj,k,n is the channel of antenna n at BS j to user k, gj,k,n represents the small scale fading coefficient between
antenna n of BS j and user k, and lj,k stands for the large scale fading coefficient between BS j and user k [16].
Concatenating all the channel coefficients from all the antennas of BS j, we obtain the channel vector hj,k, as well
as the channel coefficient matrix for signals transmitted from BS j as Hj = [hj,1,hj,2, · · · ,hj,k] .
Let yj denote the signals received by the users connecting to BS j, Wj the precoding matrix of BS j, and dj
the data sent from BS j. We have
yj = HjWjdj + nj , (1)
where nj is the zero mean circulant symmetric complex Gaussian noise vector.
Each active user has the options to connect to either the MBS or a PBS. For a user k, define user association
index variable xkj as
xkj =

1, if user k is connected to BS j.
0, otherwise.
(2)
Let its achievable rate if connected to BS j be Rkj , ηkj = xkjRkj , and its actual data rate be ηk. We have
ηk =
∑
j
ηkj =
∑
j
xkjRkj . (3)
For users connecting to a massive MIMO BS j (i.e., the MBS), their achievable rate can be approximated with
the following deterministic rate [11].
Rkj = log
(
1 +
Mj − Lj + 1
Lj
Pj lj,k
1 +
∑
j′ 6=j Pj′ lj′,k
)
, (4)
where Mj is the number of antennas at the BS, Lj is the prefixed load parameter of the BS indicating how many
users it could serve, and Pj is transmit power from the MBS. Note that there is no small scale fading factor in (4).
This approximation has been proven to be accurate [11].
For a PBS with a conventional MIMO, we assume that the inter-cell interference is negligible among the picocells,
due to the small transmission powers and effective inter-cell interference coordination (ICIC) [15]. The achievable
rate of user k connecting to PBS j can be represented as follows.
R˜kj = log
1 + Pj
∣∣∣hHj,kwj,k∣∣∣2
1 +
∑
k′ 6=k Pj
∣∣∣hHj,kwj,k′ ∣∣∣2
 , (5)
where wj,k is the k-th column of BS j’s precoding matrix Wj . There are many precoding designs for conventional
MIMO BS’s, such as matched filter (MF) precoding, zero forcing (ZF) precoding, and regularized zero forcing
(RZF) precoding [16]. Without loss of generality, we adopt MF precoding in this paper with Wj = 1√ϕHHj , where
ϕ is a power normalization factor. The signal received by all the users connecting to PBS j can be rewritten as
follows.
yj =

hHj,1hj,1d1 + h
H
j,1hj,2d2 + · · ·+ h
H
j,1hj,kdk
hHj,2hj,1d1 + h
H
j,2hj,2d2 + · · ·+ h
H
j,2hj,kdk
· · ·
hHj,khj,1d1 + h
H
j,khj,2d2 + · · ·+ h
H
j,khj,kdk
 . (6)
Thus, the achievable rate for user k regarding to PBS j can be obtained as follows.
ηkj = log
1 + Pj
∣∣∣xkjhHj,khj,k∣∣∣2
1 +
∑
k′ 6=k Pj
∣∣∣xk′
j
hHj,khj,k′
∣∣∣2
 . (7)
III. CENTRALIZED USER ASSOCIATION
In this section, we consider the problem of centralized user association. We assume that the BS’s have all the
channel state information (CSI) via uplink training. We adopt the following utility function for each user k with
achievable rate ηk.
U(ηk) =

η1−αk /(1− α), if α > 0, α 6= 1
ηk, if α = 0
log(ηk), if α = 1.
(8)
When α = 0, maximizing U(·) yields the maximization of the sum rate (but no fairness); when α → ∞, it leads
to the maximization of the worst-case rate (i.e, max-min fairness); when α = 1, it yields the maximization of the
geometric mean rate (i.e., proportional fairness).
Our goal is to maximize the system utility by configuring the user-BS association. Typically, we consider the
cases when α = 0 and α = 1. In the case of α = 1, we define U(0) = 0.
A. Maximizing Sum-rate
We firstly investigate the problem of maximizing the system sum rate, i.e., α = 0 in (8) and U(ηk) = ηk. The
problem can be formulated as follows.
P1-1: max
{xkj }
K∑
k=1
ηk (9)
s.t.
∑
k
xkj ≤ Lj ≤Mj , j = 1, 2, · · · , J∑
j
xkj ≤ 1, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K
Constraints (2), (3), (4), (7).
Note that the second constraint requires the number of users connecting to a BS to be no more than its prefixed
load, which should in turn be no more than the number of antennas it has, since theoretically BS j can provide
at most Mj degrees of freedom (DoF). Assuming the Lj’s are already chosen to satisfy Lj ≤ Mj , we drop this
constraint in the remainder of this paper. The third constraint simply claims that each user can connect to at most
one BS at a time.
A key observation is that (7) can be rewritten as
ηkj = xkj log
1 + Pj
∣∣∣hHj,khj,k∣∣∣2
1 +
∑
k′ 6=k Pj
∣∣∣xk′
j
hHj,khj,k′
∣∣∣2
 . (10)
Thus the R˜kj in (5) can be redefined as
R˜kj = log
1 + Pj
∣∣∣hHj,khj,k∣∣∣2
1 +
∑
k′ 6=k Pj
∣∣∣xk′
j
hHj,khj,k′
∣∣∣2
 . (11)
In (11), it can be seen that R˜kj depends on other users’ choices xk′j , for all k 6= k′, as well. To make the problem
tractable, we adopt the worst-case approximation by assuming the users within the coverage of BS j (denoted as
Gj) all connect to BS j with perfect channels. This way, (11) can be approximated as
R˜kj = log
1 + Pj
∣∣∣hHj,khj,k∣∣∣2
1 + (|Gj | − 1)Pj
 , (12)
where |·| for a set stands for the cardinality of the set.
Define auxiliary variables ckj as follows.
ckj =

Rkj in (4), if BS j is the MBS;
R˜kj in (12), if BS j is a PBS.
(13)
The sum rate maximization problem can be reformulated as
P1-2: max
{xkj }
K∑
k=1
J∑
j=1
xkj ckj (14)
s.t.
∑
k
xkj ≤ Lj, j = 1, 2, · · · , J∑
j
xkj ≤ 1, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K
Constraints (2), (13).
Since the variables xkj ’s are binary, problem P1-2 falls into the category of Multiple Knapsack Problems, which
is one of Karp’s 21 NP-complete problems [17]. Although a greedy algorithm could be developed to compute
sub-optimal solutions, we show that problem P1-2 can actually be optimally solved by taking advantage of its
special structure.
Let X be a matrix with entries xkj , k = 1, 2, · · · ,K , j = 1, 2, · · · , J . We could convert X to a vector x by
concatenating the rows of X and taking a transpose as x = [x11 x21 · · · xK1 · · · x1J · · · xKJ ]
T
, and simplify
the notation as x = [x1 x2 · · · xKJ ]
T
. We then apply the same conversion to the matrix comprising ckj and obtain
vector c. Problem P1-2 can be rewritten as
P1-3: max
x
cTx (15)
s.t.
K∑
k=1
x(j−1)K+k ≤ Lj, j = 1, 2, · · · , J
J∑
j=1
xk+(j−1)K ≤ 1, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K
Constraints (2), (13).
Ignoring constraints (2) and (13), define A as the constraint matrix of problem P1-3, with entries being the
coefficients of the first and second constraints. We next introduce an important definition and derive a key lemma.
Definition 1. A matrix A is called totally unimodular if the determinant of every square submatrix of A is either
0, +1 or −1 [18].
Lemma 1. The constraint matrix A of problem P1-3 is totally unimodular.
Proof: Inspecting the constraints in problem P1-3, we find that A is of the following form.
A =

1 1 · · · 1 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0 1 1 · · · 1 0 0 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0 1 1 · · · 1
1 0 · · · 0 1 0 · · · 0 1 0 · · · 0
0 1 · · · 0 0 1 · · · 0 0 1 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 · · · 1 0 0 · · · 1 0 0 · · · 1

. (16)
We can divide A into blocks as follows.
A =
A1 A2 · · · AJ
B1 B2 · · · BJ
 , (17)
where each Aj , j ∈ [1, J ], is a submatrix of A of size J ×K; and each Bj, j ∈ [1, J ], is an identity matrix of
size K ×K .
Let Sn denote an arbitrary square submatrix of matrix A of size n. For any submatrix of A of size n = 1, it is
trivial to see that the determinant of this submatrix is either 0 or +1. So we only need to consider the case where
the size of the square submatrix is greater than or equal to 2.
Case 1: Sn is taken entirely from one of the submatrices Aj or Bj , j ∈ [1, J ]. We can see from the structure
that at least one row of Aj is all zero. So if the square submatrix is entirely taken from Aj , the determinant of the
submatrix is zero. Since matrix Bj , for all j, is simply an identity matrix, it is straightforward that the determinant
of any square submatrix of Bj is either 0 or +1.
Case 2: Sn is not entirely taken from any one of the submatrices Aj or Bj , j ∈ [1, J ]. In this case, the square
submatrix must be taken from 2n (n = 1, · · · , J) submatrices of the submatrix set (Aj ∪Bj , j ∈ 1, · · · , J). We
next proceed with our proof by applying induction method.
For the base case n = 1, the square submatrix to be examined is of size 2. Since the entries can only be 0 or
+1, the determinant can only be 0, +1 or −1.
Now assuming that any square submatrix of size (n− 1) has determinant 0, +1 or −1, we need to check if the
same conclusion holds for any square submatrix of size n.
We first notice that each column of A has exactly two +1s. Moreover, exactly one of them is in Aj , and the
other in Bj . Let q∗ = argminq
∑
i Sni,q , where Sni,q is the (i, q)-th entry of Sn. That is, column q∗ has the
minimum number of 1s among all the columns of Sn.
Let ζq∗ = minq
∑
i Sni,q . ζq∗ can only be 0, 1, or 2.
If ζq∗ = 0, then all the entries of the q∗-th column of Sn are 0, which results in det(Sn) = 0, where det is short
for determinant.
If ζq∗ = 1, then we could calculate det(Sn) by expanding the q∗-th column and obtain det(Sn) = det(S(n−1)).
Since det(S(n−1)) is 0, 1 or −1 by our induction hypothesis, we conclude det(Sn) is 0, 1 or −1.
If ζq∗ = 2, we could firstly negate all the entries taken from Bj , and then add all the rows in Bj to any non-zero
row in Aj . After this procedure, if that non-zero row in Aj is still non-zero, add that row to any other non-zero
row in Aj . Repeat this process until we get a zero row in Aj . The reason why this process always give us a
all-zero row is that we have equal number of +1s in Aj and Bj . Since any basic row operation does not change
the determinant and we finally get a all-zero row, we have det(Sn) = 0. That completes our induction.
Fact 1. For a linear programming problem, if its constraint matrix satisfies totally unimodularity, then its has all
integral vertex solutions [18].
Fact 2. For a linear programming problem, if it has feasible optimal solutions, then at least one of them occurs at
a vertex of the polyhedron define by its constraints [19].
Given the facts and Lemma 1, we have the following theorem. The proof is straightforward and omitted.
Theorem 1. The optimal solution of problem P1 can be obtained by solving a relaxed problem where the variables
xkj are allowed to take real values between [0, 1].
Given the above theorem, we could obtain the optimal solution of P1 by solving the relaxed problem, termed
NP1, using common LP solvers [18].
B. Proportional Fairness
In this section, we take proportional fairness among user achievable rates into consideration. The problem can
be formulated as follows.
P2-1: max
{xkj }
K∑
k=1
log
 J∑
j=1
xkj ckj
 (18)
s.t. same constraints as problem P1-2.
Problem P2-1 is a nonlinear integer programming problem, which is generally NP-hard. To get a better under-
standing of the problem, we examine its equivalent problem as follows.
P2-2: max
xkj
K∏
k=1
 J∑
j=1
xkj ckj
 (19)
s.t. same constraints as problem P1-2.
Problem P2-2 is a geometric programming problem, with binary variables. The objective function is a posynomial
function with JK terms. Conventionally, to solve geometric programming problems we need to introduce new
variables such as y = log(x) so that geometric programming can be solved via convex programming. However,
here xkj ’s are binary. Since log(0) = −∞, we could not apply these techniques. Another heuristic scheme is to
firstly sort these JK coefficients, and then find Lj maximal coefficients for each BS. However, even sorting these
JK coefficients could be computationally prohibitive even for a small system, which requires O(JK log(JK))
operations.
A key observation about the logarithm function is that log(
∑
i τi) ≤
∑
i log(τi), for all τi ≥ 2. Therefore, in
practice,1 the optimal value of problem P2-1 is upper bounded by that of the following problem.
NP2: max
xkj
K∑
k=1
J∑
j=1
xkj log(ckj ) (20)
s.t. same constraints as problem P1-2.
We have the following results for the transformed problems.
Lemma 2. Problems P2-1 and NP2 are equivalent.
Proof: Recall that if ηk = 0, we define U(ηk) = 0. The second constraint
∑J
j=1 xkj ≤ 1 imposes that
each user could only connect to one BS. Consequently,
∑
j xkj log(ckj ) = log(
∑
j xkj ckj ). Furthermore, we have∑
k
∑
j xkj log(ckj ) =
∑
k log(
∑
j xkj ckj ).
Comparing problems NP2 to P1-2, we find they are actually equivalent. Thus we can obtain the optimal value
of P2-1 by applying the same technique used to solve problem P1-2. We then have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Sum rate maximization in Section III-A also achieves proportional fairness.
Lemma 4. The optimal value of problem P2-1 is upper bounded by UB1 =
∑K
k=1maxj log2(ckj ).
Proof: Denote m = max {ln(ck1), ln(ck2), · · · , ln(ckJ )}, we have
log2
 J∑
j=1
xkj ckj
 ≤ log2
 J∑
j=1
em
em
eln(ckj )

= log2(e
m) + log2
 J∑
j=1
eln(ckj )−m

≤ m log2(e) + log2(J) (21)
The first inequality is because xkj ≤ 1. The second inequality is due to the fact that m is the largest one among
all the xkjckj and e
ln(xkj ckj )−m ≤ 1.
On the other hand, it follows the constraint
∑J
j=1 xkj ≤ 1 that log2
(∑J
j=1 xkjckj
)
≤ log2(e
m), which is a
better bound than (21). We thus have UB1 =
∑K
k=1maxj log2(ckj ).
1Recall that ckj is the achievable rate of user k connecting to BS j. ckj ≥ 2 is generally satisfied in current wireless systems with a
sufficiently large bandwidth and high transmission power.
Algorithm 1: Greedy Algorithm 1 for User Association
1 Initialize K = {1, 2, · · · ,K}, Lj ,∀j ∈ J and xkj to be an all-zero matrix ;
2 for k = 1 to K do
3 for j = 1 to J do
4 Compute ckj as in (13) ;
5 end
6 end
7 while ∃j, Lj 6= 0 do
8 Find (k∗, j∗) = argmaxk,j{ck,j} ;
9 if Lj∗ 6= 0 then
10 xk∗
j∗
= 1 ;
11 Lj∗ = Lj∗ − 1 ;
12 K = K\k∗ ;
13 end
14 end
Algorithm 2: Greedy Algorithm 2 for User Association
1 Initialize K = {1, 2, · · · ,K}, Lj ,∀j ∈ J and xkj to be an all-zero matrix ;
2 for k = 1 to K do
3 for j = 1 to J do
4 Compute ckj as in (13) ;
5 end
6 end
7 for j = 1 to J do
8 while Lj 6= 0 do
9 Find (k∗, j) = argmaxk{ck,j} ;
10 xk∗
j
= 1 ;
11 Lj = Lj − 1 ;
12 K = K\k∗ ;
13 end
14 end
For comparison purpose, we propose two sub-optimal greedy algorithms, i.e., Algorithms 1 and 2, as bench-
marks. They can be directly used for comparison with problem P1-1. To compare with problem P2-1, in Al-
gorithm 1, we need to change Steps 7 and 8 as “while ∃j, Lj 6= 0 & maxk,j log(ck,j) > 0 do” and “Find
(k∗, j∗) = argmaxk,j{log(ck,j)},” respectively. In Algorithm 2, we need to change Step 8 and 9 as “while Lj 6= 0
& maxk log(ck,j) > 0” and “Find (k∗, j) = argmaxk log(ck,j),” respectively.
C. Joint Resource Allocation and User Association
In this section, we take resource allocation into account. Consider a massive MIMO OFDMA HetNet. In OFDMA
systems, such as LTE, the time-frequency resource is divided into resource blocks (RB). A typical RB consists of
12 subcarriers (180kHz) in the frequency domain and 7 OFDMA symbols in the time domain (0.5 ms). So the
system may have up to several hundreds of RBs. We normalize it to be a unit number. A user k connecting to a BS
j gets a portion βkj of the overall resource. The goal is to maximize the system utility considering both resource
allocation and user association.
Considering the logarithm rate utility and defining Φj =
{
k | xkj = 1
}
, the problem is formulated as follows.
P3-1: max
{xkj ,βkj }
K∑
k=1
log
 J∑
j=1
xkj ckjβkj
 (22)
s.t.
∑
k∈Φj
βkj ≤ 1, j = 1, 2, · · · , J
same constraints as problem P1-2.
To solve problem P3-1, we need to: (i) select users for each BS to serve and (ii) allocate resources to the associated
users at each BS. We next propose a series of primal decomposition and dual decomposition to solve the problem
optimally.
It is worth noting that the problem can also be formulated in a different way, by substituting constraint
∑J
j=1 xkj ≤
1, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K with a new constraint
∑J
j=1 xkj = 1, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K . We call this problem P3-2. Comparing
these two formulations, we have the following observations.
1) Problem P3-1 does not require that every user must be connected, while problem P3-2 requires each user be
connected, even under unfavorable conditions.
2) Problem P3-2 has a more stringent requirement than problem P3-1. Therefore the optimal value of problem
P3-2 is upper bounded by that of problem P3-1.
3) Since problem P3-1 offers more choices of user association, problem P3-1 is slower in convergence than
problem P3-2.
We focus on the harder problem P3-1. Given the algorithm to solve problem P3-1, problem P3-2 can be readily
solved. Due to integer variables xkj and real variables βkj , problem P3-1 is a mixed integer nonlinear programming
problem (MINLP), which is generally NP-hard. However, next we propose an algorithm to obtain its optimal solution.
Since xkj ’s take binary values and
∑J
j=1 xkj ≤ 1, we have
∑K
k=1 log
(∑J
j=1 xkj ckjβkj
)
=
∑K
k=1
∑J
j=1 xkj log(ckjβkj ).
Recall that if
∑J
j=1 xkj = 0, the logarithmic utility is 0. Thus problem P3-1 can be reformulated as
P3-3: max
{xkj ,βkj }
K∑
k=1
J∑
j=1
xkj log(ckjβkj ) (23)
s.t. same constraints as problem P3-1.
The choices of βkj rely on the values of xkj . Given these coupled variables, we first apply the Primal Decom-
position method [20] to decompose problem P3-3 to the following two levels of problems. Fixing variables xkj ’s,
we have the lower level problem as
max
{βkj }
K∑
k=1
J∑
j=1
xkj log(ckjβkj ) (24)
s.t.
∑
k∈Φj
βkj ≤ 1, j = 1, 2, · · · , J.
When the βkj ’s are fixed, the higher level problem (or, the master problem) is given by
max
{xkj }
K∑
k=1
J∑
j=1
xkj log(ckjβkj ) (25)
s.t. same constraints as problem P1-2.
Since there are no couplings among the subproblems, the lower level problem (24) can be further decomposed into
L subproblems as follows.
max
{βkj }
K∑
k=1
xkj log(ckjβkj ) (26)
s.t.
K∑
k∈Φj
βkj ≤ 1, j = 1, 2, · · · , J.
Defining Lagrange multiplier λ, the Lagrangian of problem (26) is defined as
L =
K∑
k=1
xkj log(ckjβkj ) + λ
(
1−
K∑
k=1
βkj
)
. (27)
Applying KKT conditions [21], the optimal solution can be obtained as follows.
βkj =
xkj∑K
k=1 xkj
. (28)
Substituting (28) into the master problem, the objective function becomes
K∑
k=1
J∑
j=1
xkj log
(
ckj∑K
k=1 xkj
)
. (29)
Note that we have dropped one xkj term in (29), since due to the definition (2), we have (xkj )2 = xkj . Since∑K
k=1 xkj is in the denominator, problem (29) has coupled objectives. The main idea of addressing the coupled
objective is to introduce auxiliary variables and additional equality constraints so that the coupling in the objective
function is transferred to coupling in the constraint [20]. We thus introduce a new variable, which is defined as:
Ξj =
K∑
k=1
xkj . (30)
To solve the above problem, we relax xkj to a real number in [0, 1]. However, we will show later that even if we
have relaxed the variables, we could still find the optimal solution to the original problem. The relaxed problem to
be solved is
max
{xkj }
K∑
k=1
J∑
j=1
xkj log
(
ckj
Ξj
)
(31)
s.t. Ξj ≤ Lj, j = 1, 2, · · · , J
J∑
j=1
xkj ≤ 1, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K
0 ≤ xkj ≤ 1, for all k, j
Constraints (13), (30).
Problem (31) is a convex optimization problem. Defining Lagrange multipliers for the equality constraints (30),
problem (31) can be solved with the dual decomposition method. Alternatively, we propose Algorithm 3 to obtain
the optimal solution of problem (31) [9], [10], [22]. In Algorithm 3, δ(t) is the step size at the t-th iteration given
by
δ(t) =
ϑ
t+ γ
, (32)
where ϑ and γ are positive numbers.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 3 optimally solves problem (31).
Proof: Let x(t)k denote the solution produced by Algorithm 3 at step t. Let ∂U(x(t)k ) be the subgradient of
the objective function in problem (31) at step t. It can be easily verified that the updated direction in step 16 of
Algorithm 3 is the subgradient direction. Since Ξj is upper bounded by Lj and K , and
∑K
k=1 xkj is upper bounded
by K , ∂U(x(t)k ) is also bounded.
Denote Ua as the final result produced by Algorithm 3 and U∗ as the optimal solution of problem (31). We
prove the theorem by contradiction. Assume that Ua is not optimal. Then there must exist an ǫ > 0 such that
Ua + 2ǫ < U
∗
. Then there must be a solution xˆk so that
Ua + 2ǫ < U(xˆk). (33)
Let t0 be sufficiently large so that for any t > t0 we have
U(x
(t)
k ) ≤ Ua + ǫ. (34)
Combining (33) and (34), we have U(x(t)k ) + ǫ < U(x(t)k ).
Let κ be a positive number that satisfies κ ≤ inf
{
‖∂U(x
(t)
k )‖
}
, for all t. It follows that
‖x
(t+1)
k − xˆk‖
2 = ‖x
(t)
k − δ
(t)∂U (t) − xˆk‖
2 (35)
= ‖x
(t)
k − xˆk‖
2 + (δ(t))2‖∂U (t)‖2 − 2δ(t)(∂U (t))H(x
(t)
k − xˆk)
≥ ‖x
(t)
k − xˆk‖
2 + (δ(t))2‖∂U (t)‖2 − 2δ(t)(U(x
(t)
k )− U(xˆk))
≥ ‖x
(t)
k − xˆk‖
2 + (δ(t))2κ2 + 2δ(t)ǫ
≥ ‖x
(t)
k − xˆk‖
2 + 2δ(t)ǫ ≥ · · ·
≥ ‖x
(t0)
k − xˆk‖
2 + 2ǫ
t∑
j=t0
δ(j).
Note that the first inequality is due to the property of subgradient. So we finally have ‖x(t+1)k − xˆk‖2 ≥ ‖x
(t0)
k −
xˆk‖
2+2ǫ
∑t
j=t0
δ(j), which cannot hold for sufficiently large t. Thus Algorithm 3 optimally solves problem (31).
Theorem 3. The optimal solution to problem (31) is also feasible and optimal to problem (29).
Proof: From problem (31) to (29), we relax the variables from binary to real and introduce an equality constraint.
The equality constraint does not change the problem. So the optimal value to problem (29) provides an upper bound
to that of problem (31). However, it can be observed from Algorithm 3 that the solutions to problem (29) are integers
rather than fractions. So the solutions are also feasible to problem (31). Since the solutions to problem (31) cannot
result in a higher optimal value than the solutions to problem (29), the solutions to problem (29) are exactly the
solutions to problem (31) as well. Henceforth, even though we transform problem (31) to problem (29), the optimal
solution is not affected by the transformation.
To sum up, the optimal solution to problem (29) can be solved with Algorithm 3. For comparison purpose, we
also propose two greedy algorithms as benchmarks, which are presented in Algorithms 4 and 5. The main idea of
the greedy algorithms is to first identify the most desirable user-BS pair, and then to allocate all the resource to
that user. This is repeated until convergence is reached.
Algorithm 3: Two Layer Dual Decomposition Algorithm for Optimization Problem (31)
1 t = 0, λ(1) = 0 ;
2 while not converged do
3 t← t+ 1 ;
4 for k = 1, · · · ,K do
5 for j = 1, · · · , J do
6 Compute ckj as in (13) ;
7 end
8 Find j∗ = argmaxj
{
log(ckj − λ
(t)
j )
}
;
9 Let x(t)kj = 0 for j 6= j
∗ ;
10 if log(ckj − λ
(t)
j ) ≥ 0 then
11 x
(t)
k∗
j
= 1 ;
12 else
13 x
(t)
k∗
j
= 0 ;
14 end
15 end
16 for j = 1, · · · , J do
17 Each BS chooses a step size δ(t) and computes Ξ(t+1)j = min{Lj , e
(λ
(t)
j
−1)} and
λ
(t+1)
j = λ
(t)
j − δ
(t)(Ξ
(t)
j −
∑K
k=1 x
(t)
kj
) ;
18 end
19 end
Algorithm 4: Greedy Algorithm 4 for Joint Resource Allocation and User Association
1 Initialize K = {1, 2, · · · ,K} and J = {1, 2, · · · , J} xkj to be an all-zero matrix ;
2 for k = 1 to K do
3 for j = 1 to J do
4 Compute ckj as in (13) ;
5 end
6 end
7 while maxk,j log(ck,j) > 0 do
8 Find (k∗, j∗) = argmaxk,j log(ck,j) ;
9 xk∗
j∗
= 1 ;
10 K = K\k∗ ;
11 J = J \J∗ ;
12 end
Algorithm 5: Greedy Algorithm 5 for Joint Resource Allocation and User Association
1 Initialize K = {1, 2, · · · ,K}, J = {1, 2, · · · , J} and xkj to be an all-zero matrix ;
2 for k = 1 to K do
3 for j = 1 to J do
4 Compute ckj as in (13) ;
5 end
6 end
7 for j = 1 to J do
8 if maxk log(ck,j) > 0 then
9 Find (k∗, j) = argmaxk ck,j ;
10 xk∗
j
= 1 ;
11 K = K\k∗ ;
12 end
13 end
IV. DISTRIBUTED USER ASSOCIATION
In the previous section, we assume a central controller that has global information and assigns users to the BS’s.
In this section, we consider distributed user association. We still assume that the BS’s have all the CSI via uplink
training. We further assume that all the BS’s, including the massive MIMO microcell BS and the small cell BS’s,
belong to the same service provider. Each user makes its own decision based on the broadcast and local information.
Throughout this section, we do not allow fractional connection. We omit constraint (2) in the problem formulation,
which is, however, enforced when solving the problem.
We model the behavior and interactions among the service provider and users using repeated game theory. The
first key problem is to determine whether the game will converge. The second key problem is to analyze whether
both sides are satisfactory about the outcome of the game, i.e., existence of the Nash Equilibrium.
A. Service Provider Sets the Price
The players of the repeated game include the service provider and the users. During each round of the game, the
service provider determines the price of the connection service. The users decide whether or not to connect, and if
to connect, to which BS. The strategy of the service provide is to set the price pkj of each BS j for each user k,
while the strategy of each user k is to set xkj to either 0 or 1 for j ∈ J .
The utility of the service provider is defined as UB =
∑K
k=1
∑J
j=1 xkjpkj . Since each BS is constrained by its
maximum load capacity Lj , the service provider aims to solve the following problem.
max
{pkj }
UB =
K∑
k=1
J∑
j=1
xkjpkj (36)
s.t.
∑
k
xkj ≤ Lj, j = 1, 2, · · · , J.
The utility of each user is the data rate achieved minus its payment. So each user aims to solve the following
problem.
max
{xkj }
Uk = max
ωk log
 J∑
j=1
xkj ckj
− J∑
j=1
xkjpjk , 0
 (37)
s.t.
∑
j
xkj ≤ 1,
where the logarithmic function represents the satisfaction level of a user k towards its achievable rate, and ωk is
a weight used to tradeoff rate satisfaction and monetary payment. We assume that the weight ωk of each user is
drawn from a finite set W with |W| elements. This assumption is true in real-world practice. For instance, $30
for a wireless service with 60 Mbps data rate is considered to be cheap; $45 is considered to be reasonable; $60
would be acceptable; $80 would be expensive for most people; $100 would be too expensive; and $150 or above
would not be an option for most people. So the weight of the users has generally finite choices of values based on
common sense, and is typically in a range = (0,WM ), where WM is the maximum possible value for ωk.
The repeated game is played as follows. Initially, the service provider sets a price for each BS for each user
and broadcasts the prices to the users. Knowing the prices, the users will feedback the service provider of their
choices based on their own calculations. Then the service provider updates the prices and broadcasts them to the
users. Users again inform the service provider of their choices, and so forth. The process is repeated until both the
service provider and users are all satisfied with the price.
Given the players, their strategies and utilities, we have the following definition for the NE of the user association
game.
Definition 2. A strategy set
{
p∗kj , x
∗
kj
}
, for all k, j, is an NE of the repeated game if UB(p∗kj , x∗kj ) ≥ UB(pkj , x∗kj ),
for all pkj and Uk(p∗kj , x∗kj ) ≥ Uk(p∗kj , xkj ), for all k, xkj .
Due to the constraint that each user can only connect to one BS, ωk log
(∑J
j=1 xkj ckj
)
=
∑J
j=1 xkjωk log(ckj ).
Therefore the objective function of problem (37) becomes
Uk = max

J∑
j=1
xkjωk log(ckj )−
J∑
j=1
xkjpjk , 0
 . (38)
For the reformulated problem (38), the constraint ∑j xkj ≤ 1 indicates that a user may choose not to connect to
any of the BS’s. On the other hand, if we restrict
∑
j xkj = 1, then even if the service provider sets the prices to
infinity, each user will still connect to a BS, which is clearly unreasonable.
Given the utility function (38) and the constraint in (37), the optimal solution for each user can be derived as
j∗ = argmax
j∈J
[
ωk log(ckj )− pjk
] (39)
xkj =

1, if j = j∗ and ωk log(ck∗
j
) ≥ pj∗
k
0, otherwise.
(40)
Such users’ decision can be interpreted this way. A user will choose the best connection based on its own
evaluation. If its evaluation of the connection is greater than or equal to the price, it will connect to this BS.
Otherwise, the user will not connect to the BS. So we readily have the following result.
Lemma 5. The highest profit the service provider can obtain from a user k towards BS j, is the user’s evaluation.
The service provider aims to solve problem (36) by tuning variables pkj , k = 1, 2, · · · ,K , j = 1, 2, · · · , J .
However, the constraint
∑
k xkj ≤ Lj is implicitly coupled with all the pkj ’s, since according to the user’s choice,
j∗ = argmaxj∈J
[
ωk log(ckj )− pjk
]
. The service provider problem is actually with the following form.
max
{pkj }
UB =
K∑
k=1
J∑
j=1
xkjpkj (41)
s.t.
∑
k
xkj(pkj )
≤ Lj , j = 1, 2, · · · , J.
Since problem (41) has coupling constraints, one may try to introduce Lagrange multipliers to the constraint and
solve the resulting problem using dual decomposition. However, since pkj is implicitly contained in the constraint,
the gradient and subgradient are difficult to find. Next, we propose Algorithm 6 for the service provider, and then
prove that the algorithm achieves optimal utility for the service provider and the users.
Theorem 4. If the service provider adopts Algorithm 6, the game converges and the NE can be achieved.
Proof: We first notice that the service provider has priority over the users. The users always make decisions
based upon the service provider’s price setting. Basically, the service provider controls when the repeated game
terminates.
In Algorithm 6, the service provider tests out the weight of each user using binary search with O(log2(|W|))
steps. Once the service provider obtains ωk, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K , it then estimates the users’ price evaluation matrix
V as follows.
vkj = ckjωk, (42)
where vkj is the entry of matrix V at row j and column k. Following Lemma 5, the service provider can obtain
its optimal price strategy by first selecting users for each BS and solving the following problem.
max
xkj
K∑
k=1
J∑
j=1
xkjvkj (43)
s.t.
∑
k
xkj ≤ Lj, j = 1, 2, · · · , J∑
j
xkj ≤ 1, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K
Constraints (2), (42).
The optimal solution x∗kj to the above problem can be solved in a similar way as solving problem P1-2. Then
the optimal prices for the service provider can be obtained as follows.
p∗kj =

vkj , if x∗kj = 1;
vkj + ǫ, otherwise,
(44)
where ǫ is an arbitrary positive number.
Therefore, by adopting Algorithm 6, the optimal utility (highest) can be reached for the service provider.
Meanwhile, we could see that all the users’ utility must be 0 due to the optimal price setting (i.e., each user’s
rate satisfaction matches its monetary payment). That means, all the users achieve the optimal utility given the
price setting as well. Therefore, the game converges to the NE.
Note that it is possible that the optimal utility of the service provider will be lower than the maximum utility
during the game, because the load capacity constraint may be violated due to the distributed operation.
B. A User Bidding based Approach
We next consider a bidding approach to the problem. Before service starts, users bid to the service provider
according to their predicted satisfaction towards each BS. And service provider determines whether or not to accept
a user’s bid and feedback the decisions to users. Then the users make another round of bids according to its predicted
Algorithm 6: Algorithm for Service Provider
1 Initialize ωMAX , ωMIN , t = 0 ;
2 for k = 1 to K do
3 for j = 1 to J do
4 Compute ckj as in (13) ;
5 end
6 end
7 for k = 1 to K do
8 ωuk (t) = ωMAX ;
9 ωlk(t) = ωMIN ;
10 end
11 while not converged do
12 for k = 1 to K do
13 wˆk(t) =
1
2
(ωuk (t) + ω
l
k(t)) ;
14 for j = 1 to J do
15 pkj (t) = max
{
wˆk(t) log(ckj ), 0
}
;
16 end
17 end
18 t← t+ 1 ;
19 for k = 1 to K do
20 if |Fk| > 1 then
21 ωuk (t) = ω
u
k (t− 1) ;
22 ωlk(t) = ω
l
k(t− 1) ;
23 else if |Fk| = 1 then
24 ωuk (t) = ω
u
k (t− 1) ;
25 ωlk(t) = ωˆk(t) ;
26 else
27 ωuk (t) = ωˆk(t) ;
28 ωlk(t) = ω
l
k(t− 1) ;
29 end
30 end
31 end
32 for k = 1 to K do
33 for j = 1 to J do
34 Calculate vkj as in (42) using wˆk ;
35 end
36 end
37 Solve (43) and find optimal price as in (44) ;
Algorithm 7: Algorithm for the Service Provider with the Bidding Approach
1 while not converged do
2 for j = 1 to J do
3 if BS j is bidden by ≤ Lj users then
4 Keep all the users in BS j’s waiting list ;
5 else
6 Keep the top Lj users with the highest bids and reject the other users ;
7 end
8 end
9 end
satisfaction and the service provider’s decision history. The service provider again decides whether or not to accept
a user’s bid and feedback the decision, and so forth.
Assume date-intensive users that strive for as high data rate as possible. Each user solves the following problem.
max
{pkj }
Uk = max

J∑
j=1
xkjωk log(ckj ), 0
 (45)
s.t.
∑
j
xkj(pkj ) ≤ 1.
On the other hand, the service provide aims to maximize its utility, i.e., the total payment made by all the users.
max
{xkj }
UB =
K∑
k=1
J∑
j=1
xkjpkj (46)
s.t.
∑
k
xkj ≤ Lj, j = 1, 2, · · · , J.
Note that the decision variables in these two problems are different from those in problems (36) and (37), respectively.
We assume the general case that K ≥
∑J
j=1 Lj (i.e., not all the users can be served). In order to achieve the
greatest level of satisfaction, each user makes the highest possible payment. So the optimal solution for each user
is
pkj = max

J∑
j=1
xkjωk log(ckj ), 0
 . (47)
The optimal strategy for the service provider is summarized in Algorithm 7.
During the first stage of the game, each user offers a price to its most desirable BS. Algorithm 7 is used to check
if each BS j receives more than Lj bids. The service provider only puts Lj top users on BS j’s waiting list based
on the offered prices; and rejects all other users. If BS j receives no more than Lj bids, all these users will be put
on BS j’s waiting list.
At the second stage, if a user is in a BS’s waiting list, it will keep on bidding the same BS with the same price to
guarantee the highest utility. However, if a user gets rejected in the previous round, as being selfish, it will exclude
the BS’s that have rejected it and offers a price to its most desirable BS among the remaining ones. For the service
provider, it adopts the same strategy. If the number of bids received for a BS outnumbers the load capacity of that
BS, the service provider only keeps the Lj most desirable users on the waiting list and rejects the others. It keeps
all users on the waiting list if the number of offers received is less than a BS’s load capacity. This two stages repeat
until convergence is achieved.
Lemma 6. The sequence of bids made by a user is non-increasing in the user’s preference list.
Proof: Before a user makes an offer, it computes the satisfaction of all the BS’s to obtain a preference list.
Since a user aims to maximize its utility, it first proposes to the BS with the highest satisfaction. If it is rejected by
the BS, it will propose to the BS with the second highest satisfaction, and so forth. Note that even if a user may
be on the waiting list of a BS, it may be removed from that waiting list at a later stage. If that happens, this user
will start bidding to other BS. A user will repeat this procedure until it is finally in a BS’s serving list or rejected
by all BS’s. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 7. The sequence of bids a BS put on the waiting list is non-decreasing in its preference list.
Proof: Given the fact any BS has a finite load capacity and K ≥ ∑Jj=1 Lj , all the base station will have at
least one user bidding to it at some stage of the game. Since a BS aims to maximize its utility, it puts all the users
who make an offer on the waiting list. On the condition that there are too many users, it will reject the users who
it will never served. In the next round of game, the BS will often have more or at least the same amount of bids
compared to its current waiting list. This means that the BS has more choices. The BS again only keeps the most
profitable ones and reject or remove the others from the waiting list. So the sequence of bids a base station put on
the list is non-decreasing in its preference list.
Theorem 5. The repeated bidding game converges.
Proof: Based on Lemmas 6 and 7, we prove this theorem by contradiction. Suppose that this repeated game
does converge. Then there must be a stage of the game that (i) there is a user k and BS j pair so that user k is
connected to another BS j′ or is not connected to any BS; (ii) user k prefers BS j to BS j′ or prefers to be not
connected; and (iii) BS j prefers user k to a user k′ who is on its serving list.
Consider the case where user k is served by BS j′. Since the sequence of bids made by a BS is non-decreasing,
it must be the case that user k has never bidden to BS j during the game. Otherwise, if user k has bidden to BS
j, BS j would not have ended up with choosing k′ over k. In this case, user k would never have bidden to BS j′
either, since user k prefers j to j′ and the bids (see Lemma 6). However, user k is now served by BS j′, user k
must have bidden to BS j′, which contradicts that user k would never have bidden to BS j′.
The same reasoning holds for the case when user k is not connected to any BS. If BS j prefers k to k′ on the
serving list, BS j would never reject user k while keeping user k′.
Therefore, the game converges when every user is either on a waiting list or has been rejected by every BS, and
the game will converge.
From the proof, we can actually see that the game terminates when the least popular BS becomes fully loaded.
Theorem 6. The outcome of the repeated bidding game is optimal for both the users and service provider.
Proof: Suppose that the outcome of the game is not optimal for a user k, who is connected to BS j. Then
there must be another BS j′, which has higher ranking than BS j in the preference list of user k and has a serving
list of users
{
j′1, j
′
2, · · · , j
′
Lj′
}
. Since BS j′ serves these users, it means that BS j′ prefers them to user k and BS
j′ is at the top of the preference lists of these users. If at some stage, user k is in the waiting list of BS j (or it is
inserted by force), the game must have not terminated.
Since user k is in the waiting list, then one of the final users j′1, j′2, · · · , j′Lj′ must be currently off the list, say
user j′Lj′ . Then user j
′
Lj′
will immediately bid for BS j′, since BS j′ is at the top of its preference list among all
the remaining BS’s. And BS j′ will remove user k from its waiting list, since user k has a lowest ranking in the
preference list of BS j′. Thus when the repeated game terminates, the outcomes are optimal for each user. It is
obvious that the outcome is also optimal for the service provider as well.
From Theorems 5 and 6, we conclude that the game converges to the NE when the game terminates.
V. SIMULATION STUDY
We validate the proposed user association schemes with simulations. Throughout the simulations, we assume
lj,k = 1/(1+ (
dj,k
40 )
3.5) for the path loss between a user and the massive MIMO BS, and lj,k = 1/(1+ (dj,k40 )
4) for
the path loss between a user and a small cell BS [11]. We assume that the power of small scale fading follows a
uniform distribution from [0.8, 1]. We fix the location of the massive MIMO BS at the center of the cell. The other
BS’s are randomly placed across in the cell. Users are randomly placed in the area. The other parameter settings
are listed in Table I. The error bars in the plots are 95% confidence intervals.
TABLE I
SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Mmassive 100 M 4
Lmassive 10 L 4
Pmassive 40 dBm P 40 dBm
Area 1000 × 1000 m2 J 11
TABLE II
RATE MAXIMIZATION OF CENTRALIZED CONTROL
K 50 100 150 200 250
Optimal Rate Maximation 382.9 483.4 543.1 572.3 594.0
Greedy Algorithm 1 363.5 480.0 540.4 571.1 592.6
Greedy Algorithm 2 191.0 279.6 340.6 371.5 392.5
TABLE III
LOG RATE UTILITY OF CENTRALIZED CONTROL
K 50 100 150 200 250
Optimal Log Rate Max. 128.7 155.5 167.7 172.7 176.0
Greedy Algorithm 1 115.0 153.3 166.9 172.4 175.7
Greedy Algorithm 2 67.5 97.7 122.0 133.5 140.0
Table II presents a comparison of rate maximization with the optimal solution and the two proposed greedy
algorithms. Tabel III shows a comparison of rate maximization considering proportional fairness with the optimal
solution and the two proposed greedy algorithms. We can see from both tables that the optimal solution achieves
the highest network utility. We also notice that as the number of users increases, the gaps between the optimal
utility and the greedy solutions become more and more narrower. This is because that as there are more users, the
user diversity effect becomes stronger. So the greedy algorithms and the optimal user association algorithm tend to
produce similar solutions.
Throughout this paper, the constraint for each user is
∑J
j=1 xkj ≤ 1. It should provide upper bounds for the
problem with the constraint
∑J
j=1 xkj = 1. A comparison of these two different constraints is presented in Fig. 1.
For a fair comparison, we have exactly the same number of active users as the load capacity for all the BS’s. For
instance, when the system load capacity is 250, we have J = 51 BS’s and K = 250. We can see that the inequality
constraint problem indeed upper bounds the equality constraint problem. This is because the inequality constraint
problem could eliminate the users whose rate is too low with a negative utility.
Table IV presents a comparison of the optimal joint resource allocation and user association algorithm and the
two proposed greedy algorithms. We find that the optimal scheme achieves the highest utility. Moreover, the gap
between the optimal scheme and the greedy schemes is quite large. We also consider the equality constraint problem
as a benchmark for the comparison. For a fair comparison, we set the sum capacity of this system equal to the
number of users. So there are totally K = 50 active users in the system. The optimal solution of problem P3-2
achieves a network utility of −59.8462, while the optimal solution of problem (22) has a network utility of 29.5433.
We also found that if we connect every user, some edge users will be harmful for the network utility.
Fig. 2 shows the utility of the service provider and all users when the service provider sets the price (as in
Section IV-A). It can be seen that the repeated game converges after 8 rounds. Furthermore, the utility of all users
is monotonically decreasing. That is because once a user’s evaluation is known to the service provider, the service
provider will set prices for the highest profit, which results in 0 utility for that user. As discussed, the utility for
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Fig. 1. A comparison of the centralized algorithms with logarithmic rate utility under inequality and equality constraints.
TABLE IV
JOINT RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND USER ASSOCIATION
K 50 100 150 200 250
Optimal Joint Resource Allocation 42.3 50.8 55.8 56.1 62.0
and User Association
Greedy Algorithm 4 35.3 37.9 39.3 39.9 40.3
Greedy Algorithm 5 35.1 37.9 39.3 39.8 40.2
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Fig. 2. Convergence of the repeated game when the service provider sets the price and K = 100.
the service provider is not monotonically increasing, since during the game, the load capacity constraint may be
violated. Fig. 3 plots the utilities of the service provider and users versus the number of users. We can see that
as the number of user increases, utility of the service provider also increases. This is mainly due to the effect of
multi-user diversity. We can also observe that the game terminates after about 8 rounds no matter how many users
are active.
Fig. 4 depicts the process of the game when users bid for BS’s (as in Section IV-B). Here we deploy J = 41 BS’s.
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Fig. 3. Utility of the service provider, utility of the users, and the number of rounds for convergence for systems with various numbers of
users.
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Fig. 4. Convergence of the repeated game with respect to BS load when users bid.
The massive MIMO BS has M = 400 antennas. There are K = 350 users. The left-hand-side y-axis represents
the load of the 41 BS’s. The right-hand-side y-axis represents the utility of the service provider. We find the game
converges in about 10 rounds, and the utility of the service provider is monotonically increasing as the game
continues.
To encourage offloading from the macro BS, we consider rate bias for the BS’s in this experiment. Specifically,
we multiple the rate of the massive MIMO BS with a factor of 0.5 to encourage connection to the PBS’s. Fig. 5
shows the result when configuration shown in Table I. It can be observed that the utility with rate bias is higher
than the utility without considering rate bias. This result demonstrates the efficacy of rate bias and offloading. It
can be seen that both games terminate in less than 8 rounds.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the user association problem in a massive MIMO HetNet from the centralized and
distributed perspectives. Particularly, by leveraging totally unimodularity we developed optimal algorithms for rate
maximization and rate maximization with proportional fairness problems. We also developed optimal algorithms
to the joint resource allocation and user association problem with primal decomposition and dual decomposition.
Modeling the behavior and interaction of the service provider and users with repeated games, we developed effective
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Fig. 5. Utility of the service provider with or without rate bias, and convergence of the games under different numbers of users.
distributed algorithms with proven convergence to the NE. Simulation results verify the efficacy of the proposed
schemes.
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